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Ii~

THE SUPREMJ:: COURT

. OF THE STATE OF UTAH

wr::STERN READY ~nx CONCRETE
CO~PANY, a corporation,
Plaintiff-~espondent.

vs.

Case No. 14811

RICH~Rn ~ODRIGUJ::Z and
JEANE C. LeCHEMINANT,

Defendants,
EDGAR KELLEY,
Defendant-Appellant.

:lRIEF OF

APPELLA~:fT

STA'rFnENT OF HATTJ'q,E OF CASE

This is an action by respondent, Western Ready Mix Concrete Comoanv, for th·2 failure of appellant to post a bond as required by Section 14-2-1 of the Utah Code Annotated, 1953, and
for the foreclosure of a notice of lien placed on appellant's
property by the responuent for materials used in the improvement
of appellant's real property.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The case was tried in the District Court of Salt Lake
County before the Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, Sr., who found in
favor of the respondent and awarded judgment in the sum of
~553.21,

together with attorney fees of S300.00, costs of court

of ~33.10, and a decree foreclosing respondent's lien on appelSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services

Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
lant's real property.
(R. 35-37)
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

T
Appellant filed an o~jection to the Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law on the grounds that they were not in
accordance with the facts and
unclear and ambiguous.

eviden~e

adduced at trial and were

Appellant further moved the court for a

new trial on the grounds that the evidence did not justify the
verdict and there was an error in law (R. 42-44) which the court
denied.

(R. 47-48)
RELIEF SOUGHT
The appellant seeks

~

0'.'J

APPEAL

reversal of the judgment entered

by the trial court, costs of court and attorney fees.
STATEMENT OF FZ'\CTS
Appellant, on or about the 17th day of December, 1974,
entered into a contract with Richard J. Rodriguez (referred to
the contractor) to improve appellant's real property, located at
941 South 4th East, Salt Lake City, Utah.

(R. 82, P.E. 1)

lant paid Rodriguez in full for the improvements with three

Appelc~ecks,

dated December 24, 1974, for $1,000.00; January 9, 1975, for $1,150.00
and February 19, 1975, for $1,258.38.
ordered

t~e

(R. 109, D.E. 4)

Rodriguez

cement that was used on appellant's property from the

respondent and received it on six different occasions, being January

9, 1975; January 10, 1975; February

~.

1975; February 10, 1975;

February 10, 1975 and February 12, 1975.

(R. 86, P.E. 2)

Respond-

ent claims that Rodrirruez failed to pay for the cement he received.
Rodriguez' testimony is th<it on or about the 9th or lflth of January,
1975, he paid to the respondent $600.00 in cas~ and stated this was
to pay for the cenent in the Kelley job.
testified they did receive
1't

(R.

112-113)

Respor.dents

~500. 00 from Ronriguez and they receipted

· th·
. _ k son th
, "'d ay o f F e b r~ary, 1975, but that nothing
in
eir .uoo
__ e ,n,,

(P.Services
107)
was stated
what
account
it was
to
to. and Library
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Respondent further stated thev did have a number of accounts
with Rodriguez

(R. 96) and according to company policy, they

applied the $600.00 to the oldest account without demanding of
Rodriguez a designation of what account the money should be
applied to.

(R. 108)
ARGUMENT
POINT I

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN THE LAW THAT APPLIES IN THIS CASE.
At the close of respondent's case, appellant made a
motion to dismiss based upon Section 58-23-14.5 of the Utah Code
Annotated, 1953.

(R. 38)

The motion was taken under advisement

by the court and after the appellant presented his evidence, the
motion was denied.
Section 58-23-14.5 UCA, 1953 provides:
Any owner or contractor in making any
payment ~o a materialman, contractor, or subcontractor with whom he has a running account, or
with whom he has more than one contract, or to
whom he is otherwise indebted, shall designate
the contract under which the payment is made or
the items of account to which it is to be applied.
When a payment for materials or labor is
made to a subcontractor, or materialman, such subcontractor or materialman shall demand of the person making such payment a designation of the account
and the items of account to which such payment is to
apply.
In any case where a lien is claimed for
materials furnished or labor performed by a subcontractor or materialman, it shall be a defense to
such claim that a payment made, by the owner to the
contractor for such materials has been so designated,
and paid over to such subcontractor or materialman,
and that when such payment was received by such subcontractor or materialman he did not demand a designation of the account and of the items of account to
which such payment was to be applied.
The case before the court falls squarely within this
statute.

It appears that the legislature intended to eliminate

situations
where a property owner pays a contractor for improving
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1
his real property anJ the

~ontractor

pays the materialman with

whom he has a number of accounts but fails to designate what
account the payment shall be applied to, and the materialman goes
ahead on his own and merely applies it to the oldest account, or
the account that would suit the materialrnan the best.

The legis-

lature saw fit to place the responsibility directly on the shoulders
of the materialmen to demand of the contractor exactly what account
the payment should be applied to.
I refer the court to the testimony given by :'1r. Murl

c.

Woodbury, who is the Credit Manager with respondent company.
(R. 88, 107, 108)

Q

Mr. Woodbury, I believe you stated you have other accounts

with Mr. Rodriguez, is that correct?

A

That is correct.

Q

O.I<.

In other words, this January, February, March of 1975,

what amounts do you show that !Ir. Rodriguez paid on any account
which you have with him?

A

May I look it up, Sir?

Q

S'.lre.

A

The last cash receipt I show here, Sir, is on the 2nd day of

February, 1975.

Q

And what does that show?

A

$600.00.

Q

And what account has that been credited to?

A

To the eldest invoices.

Q

Do you have a personal knowledge of why it was charqed to the

oldest account?
A

Yes.

Q

Will
you so state?
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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L

~

Ur.less the invoice so states the a~ount automati-

Yes.

cally is thereby applied to the oldest invoices.
Q

Is that your policy?

!\

Yes, sir.

Q

And did you make any personal investigation or contact Mr.

Rodriguez and ask him as to what account that should be applied
to?
A

Usually :1.r. Rodriguez brought in the amounts.

Q

No.

I

asked you did you make any contact with Mr. Rodri-

guez and ask him what account this should be applied to?
A

No,
I

sir.

also call the court's attention to the testimony of Mr.

Rodriguez in a conversation he had with Mr. Van_Roosendaal, the
President of the responcent company, who refused to deliver the
cement 1.mtil he was paid.

11r. Rodriguez stated that he paid

him $COO.OO and told him it was to apply on the Kelley job.
(~.

112-113)
"'!r. Woodbury states that this payment was receipted into

their record on February 2, 1975, and Mr. Rodriquez states that
to the best of his recollection the money was paid on January 9
or 10, 1975.

(R.

12)

The court in its Memorandum Decision seemed to put some
weigb.t on ti1is conflict in testimony wherein it stated:

(R. 32-

33)
. the testi-nony of r{odriguez offered by the
defendants in connection with their defense does
not jibe with the exhibits introduced and received
by the court, particularly those of the plaintiff,
which records were kept in the usual course of
1
•
,)usiness.
The court refused to explain just exactly what records
S.J. Quinney Law Library.
for digitization
by the Institute of
Museum and Libraryto
Services
t!·''"Y Sponsored
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to Funding
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:i.ppellant
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Conclusions of Law and asked that they be clarified.

(R.

47-48)

It appears that the court is referring to the cement delivery
orders for some are dated after the respondent received the $600.0Q,
It is interesting to note that Mr. Woodbury testified that Rodriguez
was a bad account and that he had been on C.O.D.

Yet he did not ex-

plain why the cement deliveries of January 9 and 10 were not marked
either C.O.D. or charge.

(R.

99, 101)

This seems to indicate that

the amount had been paid and Mr. Rodriguez had a credit with the
company, but later the $600.00 was applied to the oldest account and
Mr. Rodriguez was then put on charge.

Mr. Woodbury's only explana-

tion when asked why they were not C.O.D. stated that this was a
management decision.

(R. 102, P.E.

2)

Appellant submits that this is exactly the type of situation that the legislature could foresee happening and the only thing
that is material is that the contractor paid $600. 00 to the materialman which he admits receiving and further admits that he failed to
demand of the contractor a designation of the account to which the
payment should have been applied.
All other matters as to conflicting testimony of dates
and exhibits are immaterial in view of the statute.
POINT II
APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO REASONABLE ATTORNEY FEES.
The respondent brought this action under Title 38,
Chapter I of the Utah Code Annotated to foreclose a mechanics lien
and claims it is entitled to attorney fees pursuant to section
38-1-18, UCA, 1953, which provides:
In any action brought to enforce any
lien under this chapter the successful party
shall be entitled to recover a reasonable attorfee,
to Funding
be for
fixed
by the
court,
shall
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be taxec as costs in the action.
The court will note that this section provides that
the successful party shall be entitled to recover reasonable
attorney fees.

I refer the court to the case of Palombi vs.

D & C Builders, 22 Utah 2d 297, 452 P.2d 325.

In that case a

lien had been filed and the opposing party who was successful
in defense of the foreclosure action was claiming an attorney
fee and the court stated:
It will be noted the statute confers
the benefit not only on the one who asserts the
lien but upon the "successful party"; in this
instance the plaintiff, who defended against the
lien.
In view of the fact t:-,at respondent was awarded attorney fees by
the trial court, the appellant, if successful in defense of the
action, should also be awarded attorney fees.
CO~JCLUSION

In view of the record of this case and the statute
and authority cit9d herein, it should be determined by the court
that the contractor paid the respondent the amount to cover the
Kelley job and the respondent failed to demand a designation of
which account the payment should have been applied which is in
violation of the protection given the property owner by the legislature.
The court also in reversing the decision of the trial
co•.Jrt should award attorney fees to the appellant, being the
successful party on the appeal.
Respectfully submitted,

i

Homer F. Wilkinson
Attorney for defendantappellant
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CERTIFICATE OF Df:LIVERY
I hereby certify that I personally delivered two copies
of the foregoinq to E. IL Fankhauser, Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent, at 430 Judge Building, Salt Lake City, Utah

84111, this

day of February, 1977.
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